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ABSTRACT
The paper is concerned with the distribution of household incomes in 
Eastern Europe before the economic transformation that began in 1990. Was 
there less inequality in these countries under Communism than in Western 
economies? If so, and if inequality can be expected to rise to Western levels 
with the economic transformation now underway, how large an increase in 
average income is necessary to compensate the bottom income groups? We 
present empirical evidence for four Eastern European countries: 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the former USSR.
Chapter to be published in Industrial Concentration and Economic 
Inequality: Essays in Honour of Peter Hart, edited by M Casson and J Creedy, 
and to be published by Edward Elgar. The chapter draws on material on the 
distribution of income in Eastern Europe described in more detail in Atkinson 
and Micklewright (1992). We are most grateful to the many people in Eastern 
Europe who made data available to us and provided information about sources. 
In analyzing and interpreting the data, we have been greatly helped by Gianna 






















































































































































































This chapter is concerned with the empirical study of the distribution 
of income, a subject which has been a long-standing concern of Peter Hart, and 
to which he has made notable contributions. In particular, we are concerned 
with the distribution of household incomes in Eastern Europe before the 
economic transformation that began in 1990. Was there less inequality in 
these countries under Communism than in Western economies? If so, and if 
inequality can be expected to rise to Western levels with the economic 
transformation now underway, how large an increase in average income is 
necessary to compensate the bottom income groups?
In the literature on Eastern Europe, one finds two distinctly different 
opinions about the Communist record. The first is that there was in fact no 
less inequality under Communism. For example, Lydall (1979) set the 
distribution of income in the United Kingdom alongside that in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland. Comparing the percentiles of the distribution, and the 
Gini coefficient, he found for the early 1970s "little difference between the 
United Kingdom and this group of countries" (1979, p 33).
A similar conclusion was reached by Morrisson (1984) in a comparison 
encompassing a wider range of socialist countries, bringing in the former 
USSR, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Morrisson paid particular attention to the 
non-monetary advantages accruing to the privileged elite in Eastern Europe and 
included in his estimates are approximate adjustments. It is these 
adjustments in part which lead him to the finding that the income share of the 
top deciles were relatively similar in, for example, Czechoslovakia and the 
United Kingdom (UK). Even though the relative incomes of the lowest deciles 
(the bottom 4 deciles) are higher in Eastern Europe, Morrisson concluded that: 
"Czechoslovakia excepted, East European countries have not a more 
egalitarian income distribution ... all the other East European 
countries belong in the same range of income distribution as the most 
advanced of the Western countries" (Morrisson, 1984, pp 126-127).
The Gini coefficients for the individual distribution of household per capita 
incomes (that is, taking individuals ranked according to the per capita income 
of their household) were 22 percent for Czechoslovakia and 24 percent for 
Hungary, compared with 25 percent in Sweden and the UK. The Gini was 31 
percent for Poland and the former USSR, compared with 30 percent in Canada and 
34 percent in the US. (The data used by Morrisson relate mainly to the early 




























































































accords with the findings of Bergson that "Soviet income inequality probably 
has been found to be greater than often supposed. It is very possibly as 
great or greater than that in Sweden, and not much less than that in some 
other Western countries" (1984, p 1073).
On the other hand, there are those who find that income inequality was 
significantly less in Eastern Europe under Communism than in the West. 
McAuley (1979), on whose research Bergson drew, reached a rather different 
conclusion about the former USSR:
"These estimates ... yield a value of 3.14-3.21 for the decile 
coefficient [ratio of the top to bottom decile], which implies that 
there is a moderately unequal distribution of incomes in the USSR, 
inequality in the USSR was less than in the United Kingdom and 
substantially less than in either the USA or Italy" (1979, p 66).
The estimates by Wiles (1978) of the per capita income distribution in the 
Communist countries of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the 
former USSR show less inequality in Eastern Europe. His findings were 
summarised by the commentator on his paper as showing that
"during the period considered, the USA and Canada had the most unequal 
distribution, followed by Italy, Sweden and the UK, with the socialist 
countries displaying the lowest inequality of this kind" (Michal, 
Discussion of Wiles, 1978, p 193).
This conclusion is in line with that of Pryor, who had earlier estimated that 
"the Gini coefficient of total income inequality is at least [ten percentage 
points] less in the East than in the West, other things remaining equal" 
(1973, p 88).
In this chapter, we present empirical evidence for four Eastern European 
countries: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the former USSR. (For 
convenience we refer usually to "Eastern Europe" and take this as including 
the USSR; on occasion, we refer to the first three countries as "Central 
European"). The choice of these countries is to a degree arbitrary, but the 
first three are fairly obvious choices, being the countries which are most 
advanced in terms of economic and political reform. The former USSR is too 
big to be ignored; and it is the country where the Communist experiment had 
the longest trial.
The sources of evidence used in this chapter on the distribution of 
income in Eastern Europe are described in Section 2. Many people appear to 




























































































Such common impressions are, however, largely based on the situation in the 
former Soviet Union, where the distribution of income appeared next to 
alcoholism and drug addiction in the censor's list of prohibited subjects, but 
the position in the Central European countries has been quite different. 
There have been regular household surveys, and a considerable volume of 
distributional information has been published.
The evidence about the distribution of income in Eastern Europe in the 
mid-1980s is presented in Section 3. This period is chosen as one for which 
data are available, including information for the USSR, and which is at the 
same time less affected by the changes which took place towards the end of the 
decade (such as the wage reform initiated by Gorbachev). The degree of income 
in equality in Eastern Europe is compared with that in the UK. It would be 
desirable to make comparisons with a wider range of Western countries, 
including those at a similar stage of development, but for the present we 
confine the comparison to the Western country we know best. (For a recent 
comparison involving the Netherlands, rather than the UK, see Bruinooge et a 1, 
1990.)
In drawing attention to the availability of evidence on income 
inequality in Eastern Europe, we are not suggesting that such data are 
perfect. The household surveys, particularly that in the former USSR, are 
subject to a number of qualifications. The limitations of the evidence are 




























































































2. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Many people believe that under the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe 
little information was made available about the distribution of income. 
According to this view, the claims of socialism to have reduced income 
differentials or to have abolished poverty could not be assessed because of 
the absence of statistical data. Summarising the situation in his 1984 survey 
article, Bergson concluded that "the Soviet government apparently prefers to 
withhold rather than to release information" (1984, p .1091). It would however 
be wrong to suppose that the situation in the USSR was representative of 
Eastern Europe as a whole. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, there has 
been a long tradition of collecting and publishing data on the distribution 
of income. In a number of respects the availability of data in these 
countries before 1990 compares favourably with that in Britain. And the 
situation has changed dramatically with glasnost' in the Soviet Union, where 
information is now available about the distribution of household incomes in 
the 1980s (see for example Ellman, 1990).
The second common belief about data on the distribution of income in 
Eastern Europe is that they are of poor quality. It is thought that the low 
priority attached to distributional issues led to inadequate resources being 
allocated to statistical activities. It is alleged that the relation between 
Communist governments and individual enterprises, and that between the state 
and its citizens, was not such as to induce accurate reporting. But it is 
important to judge the quality of data, not by some ideal standard, but by the 
standard of what can realistically be achieved. All data are imperfect to 
some degree. Even the best designed survey has problems of incomplete 
coverage, of non-response or partial response, and of ambiguity in the 
interpretation of definitions. There are, even with best-practice statistical 
techniques, difficulties in grossing-up survey data to be representative of 
the population as a whole and of reconciling the findings with aggregate 
statistics.
The main features of the statistical sources on income distribution used 
in this chapter are summarised in Table 1. (More details are given in 
Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992.) As is made clear in the final column, 
published information relating to the distribution of household income in the 
Communist period may be found in the annual statistical yearbooks. For 
example, a quinquennial household income survey was first held in Hungary in 




























































































English language publication was produced giving results of the 1973 survey 
(Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 1975).
Turning to the UK, we may note that, in contrast with Hungary, Britain 
has not to date had a regular purpose-built household survey specifically 
designed to produce information on the distribution of income in the 
population as a whole. Evidence about the distribution of household income 
has been obtained from sources whose main purpose is different. The first of 
these is the income tax records, which are the basis for the Survey of 
Personal Income (SPI) carried out each year by the Inland Revenue. This 
however excludes a substantial part of the non-tax-paying population -- 
several million pensioners and others not at work -- and does not cover non- 
taxable income, particularly certain social security benefits such as child 
benefit. It is not therefore on its own a satisfactory source. For this 
reason, the official estimates of the overall distribution have been based on 
a combination of information from the SPI and the annual Family Expenditure 
Survey (FES). These estimates are referred to as the Blue Book estimates, 
since they used to be published in the National Income Blue Book. However, 
the methods by which these estimates are constructed means that they cannot 
be put in a form comparable with the Eastern European data. In particular, 
they cannot be used to derive a distribution by households, rather than tax 
units, and they cannot be expressed on a per capita basis. For this reason, 
we rely on the information on the distribution of income provided by the 
Family Expenditure Survey (FES), using the basic micro-data tapes.
Survey design
In terms of survey design, the odd one out in Table 1 is the former 
USSR. In contrast to standard household survey methodology in the West, which 
samples on a geographic basis, the point of departure for household income 
data collection in the Soviet Family Budget Survey (FBS) has been the 
enterprise: the sampling unit has been employees at their place of work. The 
survey has been a quota sample of families of persons working in state 
enterprises and collective farms. This meant that households without employed 
members were not normally included, although some "pure1' pensioner households 
have in fact been covered in recent years. Moreover, the quotas in the 
sampling process have meant that employees in heavy industry, and hence the 
urban population, appear to be over-represented. The survey is a panel, 




























































































implications for the representativeness of the data. The sampling design is 
one important reason why the FBS has attracted substantial criticism both 
inside and outside the Soviet Union. Shenfield argues that Soviet planners 
and academic researchers where possible avoid the FBS and concludes that
"the sample is subject to a great many different biases, often severe 
and cumulative in effect, and that the survey is highly 
unrepresentative of the population as a whole" (1984, p 3).
McAuley (1979) argues that "statistics from this source have been rejected by 
many, perhaps a majority, of Soviet economists and statisticians as worthless" 
(p 51), but goes on to note that it represents the only source of information 
on a number of questions. It is in this spirit that we use the Soviet FBS 
here, returning to the deficiencies in Section 4.
The position is quite different in the other Eastern European countries. 
In contrast to the methodology described in the USSR, the household surveys 
used here for Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were all conducted on a 
geographic basis: in these countries the dwelling, and not the worker, was the 
sampling unit. For example, the sampling frame for the Czechoslovak 
Microcensus in 1988 was a centralised administrative register used to record 
addresses of all dwellings so as to collect a combined payment for gas, 
electricity and other utilities. This seems broadly comparable to the 
Postcode Address File used since 1986 in the UK FES.
The planned coverage of the population by these surveys was reasonably 
complete, but certain categories of households were specifically excluded from 
the household surveys. This applied in Czechoslovakia and Poland to 
households with members in the army or the police. Our understanding is that 
households of members of the government or senior Communist Party officials 
were not in general excluded deliberately. In Poland a significant exclusion 
was of all households in which the main employment was the private non- 
agricultural sector, about 10 percent of the labour force. All of the 
surveys, including the FES in the UK, exclude persons living in institutions.
Response rates
The achieved samples in the household surveys have been large: about 
20,000 households in Hungary, 30,000 in Poland, 60,000 in the USSR (90,000 
from 1988) and 100,000 in Czechoslovakia. These may be compared with a sample 
size in the UK of only some 7,500 households in the FES. It is true that the 




























































































distribution of income, the Survey of Personal Incomes has a sample size of 
about 125,000 but this is based on a sample of tax records and is not a 
household survey.
The response rate to the survey by sampled households is also critical. 
To put the Eastern European surveys in perspective, it is useful to note that 
the overall level of response in Britain to the FES has typically been around
70 percent of the effective sample. By this yardstick, the success of the 
periodic Czechoslovak Microcensus and the quinquennial Hungarian income survey 
was excellent: response to the former in 1988 was 97 percent and to the latter 
was 91 percent in 1982 and 83 percent in 1987. In contrast, response in the 
1980s by households first selected for the Polish budget survey (the survey 
has a rotating panel design) was at or below the level of the British FES, 
averaging 65 percent during 1982-89, but with more variability, ranging from
71 percent in 1983 to only 58 percent in 1989. We have been unable to 
establish the extent of non-response to the Soviet family budget survey. 
Soviet statistical service (Goskomstat) officials denied to us that non­
response was a problem, but Boldyreva argues that it is difficult to get 
"deviant" families to participate (1989, p 91).
Verification pf data
Considerable effort in Eastern European surveys went into the collection 
of income data. In all four countries, earnings data provided by respondents 
were verified with their employers. A great deal of care appears to have been 
taken: for instance, in the Hungarian Income Survey where job changes had 
taken place during the year, the information was requested from each employer. 
In the Czechoslovak Microcensus, information on pensions was collected from 
post-offices.
In the UK, the FES relies solely on information supplied by the 
respondents themselves. The survey officers do not ask respondents to give 
the names of their employers so that earnings data can be verified, nor does 
the survey have access to administrative records on social security payments. 
In the case of earnings, respondents are asked to verify their replies from 
wage slips and 70-80 percent of them do so.
A significant amount of income from second economy jobs and other 




























































































this may be much more important in Eastern Europe than in the UK. The growth 
of the second economy in Hungary has been referred to by many authors (for 
example, Eltetb and Vita, 1989). There are reports of large increases in the 
USSR (Alexeev and Gaddy, 1991, p.20). In Poland, an important source of 
income for many households appears to have been transfers of hard currency 
from relatives working abroad.
The coverage in household surveys of income from outside the official 
economy is a contentious subject. Writers on Eastern Europe often express 
concern that the recorded incomes refer only to 'official' income and that 
'black economy income' does not enter the data concerned. However, the notion 
that black economy income is by definition missing from Eastern European 
household surveys is in our view incorrect. Our interpretation of the 
relevant questionnaires, based on discussions with the statistical offices 
concerned, indicate that a respondent wishing to report all income, legally 
or illegally obtained, in general had the opportunity to do so without 
penalty. Of course, the success achieved in soliciting information about 
second economy income, legal or illegal, is a matter for real debate. In 
pointing to attempts by statistical offices to collect data on "illegal'1 
income, we are not arguing that this was carried out in full. In the case of 
the USSR, a former member of the Soviet statistical service reported that 
"people with considerable concealed income refuse to take part in the 
survey. They are afraid that the rule of confidentiality will not be 
respected, and justifiably so, because survey staff are not in a 
position to guarantee confidentiality. If, say, the KGB asks then for 
information, TsSU [the name of the Soviet statistical service at that 
time, forerunner to Goskomstat] has no right to refuse" (quoted in 
Shenfield and Hanson, 1986, p.64)
Official estimates put aggregate illegal income in the USSR at some 9 percent 
of GOP with about 40 percent of this being derived from the illicit production 
of alcohol but almost none coming from unlicensed work, which hardly seems 
credible (Vestnik statistiki, 1990, no.6). Other estimates are significantly 
higher. Estimates based on a sample of Soviet émigrés suggest that up to a 
third of the urban population's income came from illegal sources (Grossman, 
1987).
The under-reporting of second economy income is a serious qualification 
of the distributional estimates for Eastern Europe. In Section 4, we refer 




























































































should however be noted that the problem of under-reporting is not absent in 
the UK, where there is, for example, concern about the accuracy of recorded 
self-employment income.
T i me, period
The data in Eastern Europe refer to annual income, whereas those in the 
UK refer to a variety of periods depending on source. The UK data presented 
here are probably best interpreted as current income, and as such may be 
expected to be more variable owing to changes in family status, wages and 
employment over the year. On the other hand, an important source of income 
variability in Britain, that stemming from unemployment, was largely missing 
in the pre-reform period in Eastern Europe. This means in turn that, if we 
were to seek to standardise the time period, it would make a difference 
whether we took the week/month or the year as the common basis. If there were 
less monthly variation in Eastern Europe, then the move to a monthly 
assessment period would not greatly change the measured inequality; but 
standardisation on a year could significantly reduce the measured inequality 
in the UK.
Presentation of results
The data for Eastern Europe relate to the distribution of income by 
households, and this is the unit of analysis adopted here. This leads in turn 
to the question as to how each unit's income is adjusted to take account of 
differences in unit size. The standard practice in Eastern Europe, and that 
followed here, is to calculate income per capita. This practice is easy to 
carry out and to explain. It is however different from that in the UK, where 
no official statistics have been published on a per capita basis. Indeed the 
main official figures, the Blue Book estimates, make no adjustment at all for 




























































































3. DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOMES
In this section we consider the evidence about the distribution of net 
household income in the five countries in the mid-1980s. In Table 2, we show 
data for 1985 in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, and for 1982 in Hungary. 
The estimates all relate to the individual distribution of household per 
capita income. In each case, the official data come in tabulated form and we 
have typically had to interpolate within ranges to arrive at estimates of the 
quantiles, quantile shares, and summary statistics of the distribution. 
(Details of the interpolation methods are given in Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1992, Sources and Methods.) The official statistics do not present data in 
Britain in per capita terms; for this reason we have given our own 
calculations for the per capita distribution in the UK based on the original 
micro-data. The Czechoslovak data exclude the value of income in kind, 
including that from agriculture, whereas an estimate of the latter is included 
in the data for the other countries.
If we look first at the percentiles, we find that Czechoslovakia has the 
least inequality. The bottom decile in Czechoslovakia has an income which is 
66 percent of the median, compared with 62 percent in Hungary, 58 percent in 
Poland, 54 percent in USSR and 52 percent in the UK. The lower quartile 
follows the same ranking, with Czechoslovakia and Hungary relatively close: 
81 and 80 percent, respectively, compared with 72 percent in the UK. Above 
the median, Czechoslovakia and Hungary appear to be grouped together as 
exhibiting the least inequality. Poland and the USSR appear to form a second 
group, with a marked difference in the upper part of the distribution between 
these countries and the UK. The top decile in Poland is 175 percent of the 
median, in USSR it is 178 percent, but in the UK it is 201 percent. Overall, 
the position is summarised clearly by the ratio of the top to bottom decile, 






The distribution of income is more commonly presented in terms of shares 
of total income, which are the ingredients for drawing the Lorenz curves. In 
the lower part of Table 2, we show the cumulative income shares, with S„ 




























































































percent. The share of the bottom 10 percent is estimated to be 4.9 percent 
in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, compared with 3.5 percent in the UK. (Poland 
and the USSR hold an intermediate position.)
Looked at from the point of view of the bottom 10 percent in the UK, 
this means that a switch to a "Czech/Hungarian" distribution of income would 
yield the same cash advantage as a 40 percent increase in average income with 
the distribution remaining unchanged. Moving up the cumulative distribution, 
the share of the bottom fifth is 11-12 percent in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
compared with 8% percent in the UK. The 'advantage' of the more equal Czech 
distribution is in this case equivalent to a difference of about 35 percent 
in average income. This is shown graphically in Figure 1. On the vertical 
is shown the increase in average income which would be necessary to compensate 
the bottom x percent for a move to a UK distribution of income, for different 
values of x from 10 to 50. In the case of the bottom 30 percent in Poland, 
for example, a rise of 13 percent in average would be necessary to compensate 
for a move to the UK distribution.
The fact that the shares S. are in each case higher, or no lower, for 
Czechoslovakia than for Hungary means that the Lorenz curve lies nearer to the 
line of equal incomes. (We do not actually draw the Lorenz curves, since the 
differences can be seen clearly from Table 2.) This applies right up the 
income scale: the share SM is 82.1 percent in Czechoslovakia, compared with 
81.4 percent in Hungary, which means that the top 10 percent in Czechoslovakia 
have a share of 17.9 percent, compared with a share of 18.6 percent in 
Hungary. (Whether or not this, or other, differences are statistically 
significant is a question that requires information about the standard errors 
surrounding these figures.)
The Lorenz curves may be used to compare other countries. The curve for 
Hungary lies inside that for Poland, the USSR, as well as the UK. The curves 
for Poland and the USSR in turn lie inside that for the UK. With a sole 
exception, we have a situation of "Lorenz dominance", where when comparing two 
countries we can say for one of the two counties that the bottom x percent 
have a larger (or no smaller) share whatever value of x we choose. The 
exception -- where the Lorenz curves cross -- concerns Poland and the USSR. 
For shares up to S„, Poland does better, but SM and above are higher in the 
USSR.
Measures of inequality




























































































distribution can be provided by a measure of income inequality. The use of 
such measures does however involve, explicitly or implicitly, judgments about 
the weight to be placed on different parts of the distribution. It is 
interesting therefore to note the differences in the measures used in 
different countries.
A favourite in many countries is the Gini coefficient. From Table 3, 
we can see that the Gini coefficient is 20 percent in Czechoslovakia and 30 
percent in the UK. Between these two countries there is indeed the ten 
percentage point difference found by Pryor (1973, p 88). Nor is 
Czechoslovakia exceptional, as some writers have suggested. The Gini 
coefficient for Hungary is nine percentage points less than that in the UK. 
It is only for Poland and the USSR that the difference from the UK is reduced 
to four percentage points.
Statisticians in Eastern Europe have tended to emphasise other measures 
of inequality, ihe "maximum equalisation percentage" made popular by the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe (1967, Chapter 6) has been used extensively in 
Poland. It involves taking those decile groups whose share exceeds 10 percent 
and adding the excess of these shares over that level. For 1985, we have (see 
Table 2) the following:
share contr 
equali
7 decile 10.6 0.6
8 decile 12.0 2.0
9 decile 14.1 4.1
10 decile 21.1 11.1
so that the total value of the index is 17.8. The index approximates the 
share of total income which has to be taken from those above the mean, and 
transferred to those below the mean in order to achieve equality. (It is an 
approximation since it is based on data grouped by deciles.) Algebraically, 
it is half the mean deviation divided by the mean. Here, in view of its 
simple interpretation, we refer to it as the Robin Hood Index (RHI). From 
Table 3, it is clear that Robin Hood would have less work to do in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia and quite a lot more work in the UK, where he would have to 
transfer 21 percent of total income.
The Hungarian statistical office has used a variation on this measure 
of inequality: the ratio of average income above the mean to average incomes 




























































































measure and the Robin Hood Index changes as the proportion of the population 
above the mean changes.) The values of the Hungarian Inequality Measure (HIM) 
are shown in Table 3. In the UK the average income of those above the mean 
is Zh times that of those below the mean, which is quite a lot higher than in 
Poland and the USSR where the ratio is double. In Hungary, the value is 1.8, 
and Czechoslovakia has again the least inequality, with a value of 1%.
Peter Hart has argued forcefully (eg in Hart, 1978) for preferring 
parametric estimators of inequality to the non-parametric induces used so far 
in this section. As he notes,
"if an income distribution approximates a standard theoretical 
statistical distribution, the choice of inequality measure is 
considerably simplified because we can use the estimated parameters of 
the theoretical distribution" (1981, p. 3).
As in his work, we have used the lognormal distribution. First, we plotted the 
cumulative distributions on log probability paper (ie plotting log income 
against a normal probability scale), which "although [it] can hardly be 
regarded as a rigorous statistical test of lognormality ... nevertheless 
provides a quick method of judging whether the population may feasibly be 
lognormal" (Aitchison and Brown, 1957, p. 32). If the distribution were 
lognormal, this procedure would yield a straight line graph. The approximate 
linearity in our plots suggested that the lognormal provided a reasonable fit, 
judged by eye, for the fifth to ninety-fifth percentiles in Hungary, USSR, and 
UK, but that there was a slight perceptible upward curve in Czechoslovakia, 
and that the fit was less good in Poland. Secondly, we obtained an estimate 
of the variance of logarithms from the ratio of the (interpolated) eighty- 
fourth and sixteenth percentiles. (The estimated standard deviation is equal 
to half the natural logarithm of the ratio -- see Aitchison and Brown, 1957, 
p. 32.) The resulting estimates of the variance of logarithms are shown in 
the final column in Table 3. Again there appear to be three groups: (a) 
Czechoslovakia, followed by Hungary, with the lowest variance, (b) then Poland 
and the former USSR, although with a more noticeable gap between them, and (c) 




























































































4. LIMITATIONS OF THE EVIDENCE
The conclusions drawn from these statistics may change when we take 
account of the deficiencies of the data. In Section 2, and in Atkinson and 
Micklewright (1992), we have described the sources of data on household 
incomes and indicated some of their limitations. As emphasised there, all 
data are imperfect, and one advantage of the comparative perspective is that 
it allows us to see how the shortcomings of the Eastern European data compare 
with those of Western data. At the same time, it should be remembered that it 
is not just differences in methods of collecting data that may cause problems. 
It is also the case that statistical deficiencies which are common to East and 
West may have different implications on account of the social and economic 
differences. Household budget surveys exclude the homeless, an omission which 
is more significant in some countries than others. Inadequate coverage of 
income from the underground economy is likely to be more important in Eastern 
Europe. The omission from income data of capital gains is more serious in 
Western countries with substantial private ownership of capital and land.
One major reference point in assessing the quality of the data has been 
comparisons with the national accounts. In the case of the USSR, Alexeev and 
Gaddy (1991), drawing on work by Treml (1990), have compared the aggregate 
incomes of several types recorded in the Family Budget Survey (FBS) with those 
shown in national accounts. The differences were an over-statement of 11 
percent of state wages and salaries, and of 6.5 percent of collective farm 
pay, and an under-statement of 10 percent in state transfers. Alexeev and 
Gaddy argue that these figures "conclusively demonstrated the 
unrepresentativeness" (1991, p 22).
These discrepancies should however be compared with those found in 
Western sources. In the case of the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data from 
the UK, we have investigated the divergence between income aggregates recorded 
in the survey for the years 1970-77 and those shown in the national accounts 
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1983). The results from this exercise for 1977 
show a shortfall for earnings in the FES of 6 percent, a figure which is 
described in the official FES Report (Central Statistical Office 1989, p v) 
as indicating that earnings in the survey are "slightly deficient". For 
social security benefits, the deficiency was 9 percent -- a figure very 
similar to that quoted for state transfers in the USSR Family Budget Survey.
When we come to income from self-employment and occupational pensions, we 




























































































income as much as one half of total income appears to be missing from the FES.
The fact that such large income shortfalls should be observed in the UK 
FES, a survey which is widely recognised within the UK and elsewhere to be of 
a high standard, leads us to be cautious in reaching critical conclusions 
about the data for Eastern Europe. We find relatively reassuring the finding 
that per capita personal income recorded in the 1987 Hungarian income survey 
was 96 percent of that indicated by aggregate sources (Statistical Yearbook, 
1988, p.427). Similarly, we were told that per capita money income in the 
1988 Czechoslovak microcensus was 86 percent of that suggested by aggregate 
data but that at least half the shortfall could be attributed to differences 
in definition, something which we found to be important in the comparison of 
the UK FES with the national accounts (and which has been allowed for in the 
comparison quoted).
At the same time, there are clearly weaknesses in the available 
household income data. Here we concentrate on those which may have caused 
inequality to be under-stated in Eastern Europe, and those which may cause 
inequality to be over-stated in the UK.
Sample design
The first reason for under-statement of inequality in the USSR is the 
problem of the sample design. As a result of the way that the sample is drawn 
for the Soviet FBS, there can be no doubt that the survey is un­
representative. The under-representation of pensioner households may be 
expected to cause inequality to be under-stated, although this under­
representation may be less serious in the 1980s than in the past. A second 
major problem is that the panel nature of the FBS leads it to be 
unrepresentative of the working population, in that it is biased towards those 
with longer service records. This again may cause inequality to be under­
stated.
In the three Central European countries, the sample design is comparable 
with that in the UK, except for the exclusion in Poland of households whose 
principal source of income is the private non-agricultural sector. The latter 
exclusion may cause inequality to be under-stated. Differential non-response, 
in all three countries, may have the same effect: for example, there are signs 
that response is lower in large cities, where there may be more of both high- 




























































































different across countries and that in the case of Poland non-respondents were 
substituted with other households with similar characteristics.
Hissing income
Among respondents there is a problem of incomplete reporting or coverage 
of income. The incomplete coverage of agricultural production affects Eastern 
Europe to a greater degree than the UK. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the 
distribution examined here does not include the value of farm production for 
own-consumption. This may cause the degree of inequality to be over-stated 
insofar as this source of income is proportionately more important at the 
bottom of the scale. In the case of the other Eastern European countries, an 
estimate of this income is included but there are issues concerning the 
valuation of output. The use of state prices for farm produce may cause 
incomes such as those of collective farm workers in the USSR to be under­
stated.
One of the most important problems is the omission or under-recording 
of income from private business activity, illegal activities and from overseas 
remittances. Assessing the possible effect of unrecorded incomes on the 
distribution of income is a daunting task. An impressive attempt to do so is 
the study for Hungary by Elteto and Vita (1989). They took as their starting 
point the microdata in the 1982 Hungarian income survey. The survey sample 
for this year was divided into 71 sub-groups on the basis of sex, occupation 
and type of residence, and the individuals in each were subjected to a 
separate micro-simulation treatment in respect of "hidden" income, defined by 
the authors as "unauthorized and/or tax-evading productive and service 
activities, tips, gratitude payments" (1989, p.4). This simulation increased 
the incidence and/or recorded amounts of hidden income in each sub-group, with 
for example high values of these parameters for doctors, dentists, 
hairdressers and beauticians living in Budapest. Within each group simulated 
amounts of hidden income for each individual were drawn from a lognormal 
distribution. The recorded data in the 1982 survey indicated that these forms 
of income accounted for only 2 percent of personal income. Elteto and Vita 
experimented with three different assumptions increasing the proportion of 
hidden income in "low", "medium" or "high" variants to 6, 8, or 11 percent 
respectively. The effect of the simulations were to increase inequality of 
incomes; we estimate from Elteto and Vita's results that the decile ratio rose 




























































































Table 2, we can see that, even taking the "high" variant, and even supposing 
no upward adjustment to be necessary to be the UK figures, there remains 
noticeably less inequality in Hungary. (The UK decile ratio is 3.9.) The 
results from this exercise cannot of course be seen as necessarily 
representative of the impact of under-recording of income in Central Europe. 
However, certain aspects of the Hungarian situation may be applicable, and it 
gives an impression of the possible quantitative impact. In the case of the 
USSR, there has been debate as to the distributional impact of illegal 
incomes. It has been suggested that illegal earnings in different jobs were 
inversely related to the official rates of pay. Alexeev and Gaddy make use 
of data for a sample of some 1,000 families which emigrated from the USSR to 
the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The results show that 
the Gini coefficient for total income from all sources, legal and illegal, was 
only 1 percentage point higher than that for legal incomes for those coming 
from Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia and the Baltic republics, but that it 
was 7 percentage points higher for those from the Transcaucasus and Central 
Asian republics (Alexeev and Gaddy, 1991, Table 5.1). It should be noted that 
the results are based on a small and largely urban sample.
Non-monetarv privileges of the elite
One of the features of the former USSR that has attracted considerable 
Western attention is the provision of substantial benefits in kind to a small 
"elite" group of nomenklatura: top Party and government officials, army 
officers, managers, scientists, academics, etc (see, for example, the study 
by Matthews, 1978). These included the provision of superior housing, 
provision of cars and chauffeurs, holiday homes (dachas), access to foreign 
currency for travel, access to foreign currency shops where imported goods 
could be purchased, etc. At the same time, non-cash benefits are not limited 
to the elite, and the more evident privilege at the top should be seen as part 
f structured pattern of differential remuneration. Particularly in the USSR, 
the "quality" of the enterprise one worked for was a most important 
determinant of living standards independent of the level of earnings.
What is the likely impact of such benefits in kind on the degree of 
income inequality in Eastern Europe? One brave attempt to estimate the 
effect of benefits for the nomenklatura was that of Morrisson (1984). He 
started from estimates for the size of the "privileged" population varying 




























































































noted by several writers, adjustment for the missing income of a group of this 
size would not affect the estimated decile ratio or other percentiles below 
the elite group. (These measures would of course be affected by more 
generally distributed non-wage benefits received by those lower down the 
distribution.)
The shares in total income and the Gini coefficient would however be 
affected. In order to show what he believed to be the maximum impact of 
special advantages of the 'privileged', Morrisson made an adjustment to the 
data on household income distribution for a number of Eastern European 
countries, including the four we considered here, by assuming that these 
advantages in every country represented at most half the recorded income of 
the top 5 percent of the distribution. Summary inequality measures of the 
income distribution were then estimated for each country with and without the 
adjustment for top incomes. In between these, Morrisson argued, "the true 
distribution certainly lies" (1984, p .126).
To treat the elite population as being as extensive as the top 5 percent 
seems to be casting the net wide. In contrast, Bergson (1984, p. 1070) took 
the elite population as 0.3 percent of the urban population, and Morrisson 
himself referred to 1% percent (1984, p. 126n). Here we present an 
alternative calculation, taking the latter figure to represent the elite 
population, and asking how large the payments to the top 1% percent would have 
to be for the Gini coefficient in Eastern Europe to be equal to that in the 
UK in 1985 (29.7 percent). It should be borne in mind that this can only be 
an approximate calculation since we are interpolating in an open upper 
interval to arrive at the share of the top 1 % percent. (Also, since this is 
only an illustrative calculation, we use the linearised Lorenz curve drawn in 
terms of deciles to calculate the Gini coefficient.) The calculation shows 
that the increase in their income necessary to raise the Gini coefficient to 
the UK level would be around 125 percent in the USSR and Poland: ie we would 
have to more than double the income of the top 1% percent. In the case of 
Hungary, the income of the top 1% percent would have to be multiplied by a 
factor of some 4^; for Czechoslovakia it would require a factor of 5. This 
calculation is clearly arbitrary, and attributes no value to what may 
admittedly be the lesser but nonetheless widespread non-wage benefits received 
by those at lower points of the income distribution.
In the West, these benefits in kind are referred to as "fringe 




























































































small in scale or extent. Indeed, in a country such as Britain, minor 'perks' 
or better working conditions associated with better paid jobs are so 
widespread as to scarcely warrant mention. Substantial benefits are available 
to top managers in the private sector. Obtaining quantitative evidence about 
the scale and distribution of payments in kind is not easy. In Britain, the 
Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth (1979) distinguished 
between "welfare" benefits, generally available to all employees in a firm, 
including free or subsidised meals, sports facilities, and goods at discount 
prices, and benefits intended to attract and retain staff, particularly 
executives, which were concentrated at the top end of the earnings scale. The 
survey evidence quoted by the Commission showed 67 percent of executives with 
full use of a company car, 62 percent with free life assurance, 44 percent 
with free medical insurance, and 10 percent with low interest loans (1979, 
Table 9.9). The overall conclusion of the Royal Commission was that 
"there is little doubt that if account were taken of employee 
benefits, working conditions and other aspects of employment, the 
dispersion of the earnings distribution would be increased. The 
effect within the top one per cent of employees must be 
particularly marked." (1979, p 233).
The United Kingdom data
There are also factors which may cause the degree of inequality in the 
UK to be over-stated. The measurement of income over a week or month may lead 
to a higher recorded degree of inequality than annual income. Estimates of 
the possible effect have been made by Nolan using the same data source as in 
Table 2, but for the earlier year of 1977. The effect on the inequality of 
pre-tax income is to reduce the Robin Hood Index from 24.9 percent to 24.2 
percent (1987, Table 5.1 p 71). On this basis we could account for only a 
modest part of the difference. Moreover, against this must be set a number 
of factors which may cause inequality to be under-stated in the UK. These 
include the lower response of the self-employed to the FES, the tendency for 
self-employment and investment income to be under-stated, and the omission of 





























































































The aim of this chapter has been to summarise the evidence about the 
distribution of household income in three countries of Central Europe and the 
former USSR, compared with the United Kingdom. The evidence refers to the 
mid-1980s, and it should be noted that the trends over time in the five 
countries have been rather different (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992, 
Chapter 5), so that the conclusions may differ for this reason for those 
reached in earlier studies.
Our results for the mid-1980s confirm the earlier finding that income 
inequality in Czechoslovakia is substantially less than in the UK. The Gini 
coefficient is some ten percentage points less, and the decile ratio is 2.4 
compared with 3.9. Put another way, if the price of economic progress in 
Czechoslovakia is a fall in the share of the bottom 10 percent to that in the 
UK, then an increase of 40 percent in real average income is necessary for the 
lowest 10 percent simply to maintain their absolute level of income.
At the same time, our findings bring out the differences, not just 
between East and West, but also within Eastern Europe. The distribution for 
Hungary appears relatively close to that in Czechoslovakia: the share of the 
bottom 10 percent is the same, and the Gini coefficient in Hungary is only 1 
percentage point higher. But the Lorenz curves for these two countries lie 
comfortably inside those for Poland and the former USSR. The Gini 
coefficients for these latter two countries are some 4-5 percentage points 
higher. So that, while we find the recorded degree of inequality to be less 
in all four countries than in the UK, they should not be regarded as 
identical.
The above summarises briefly what the statistics show about the 
distribution of household income in Eastern Europe. The italicised phrase is 
important, since we have emphasised the shortcomings of the statistical data 
in both Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom. We should also stress the 
problems of interpretation which surround the concept of income in Eastern 
Europe, notably those that arise in an economy where goods are rationed (this 





























































































Sources of data on the distribution of incoie used in this chapter
Type of Source 
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Table 2 Summary of income distribution in 1982-5
Individual distribution 
P Pr10 ' 25
of household per capita income.
P75 P90 P95 P90/P10
Czechoslovakia 
1985 66.4 81.4 127.1 160.3 182.9 2.41
Hungary
1982
62.0 79.5 128.6 162.1 187.8 2.61
Poland
1985
57.6 75.0 134.2 175.1 209.2 3.04
USSR
1985
53.7 74.3 135.3 177.3 206.9 3.30
United Kingdom 




s„ S30 S40 Sso SM s„ S» s„ s„
Czechoslovakia 
1985 4.9 11.6 19.2 27.4 36.3 46.0 56.6 68.4 82.1 90.0
Hungary
1982
4.9 11.3 18.6 26.7 35.6 45.3 56.0 67.9 81.4 89.4
Poland
1985
4.2 9.9 16.6 24.2 32.7 42.1 52.7 64.7 78.8 87.4
USSR
1985
3.9 9.4 16.1 23.7 32.2 41.8 52.6 64.9 79.4 88.0
United Kingdom 
1985 3.5 8.6 14.7 21.7 29.7 38.8 49.2 61.5 76.5 85.9
Sources: Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), Statistical Appendix Tables 
CSIl(continued), CS12, HI 1, HI2, P11, PI2, UI1, UI2, BI3. Interpolation using 




























































































Table 3 Measures of income inequality




1985 19.9 13.9 1.76 0.113
Hungary
1982
20.9 15.0 1.82 0.132
Poland
1985
25.3 17.8 2.06 0.185
USSR
1985




29.7 21.2 2.74 0.268
Source: see Table 2.
Notes:
(a) RH1 is the "Robin Hood Index" and measures the proportion of the income 
of those above the mean that would have to be redistributed to bring about 
equal income.
(b) HIM is the "Hungarian Inequality Measure" and is the ratio of the 
average incomes of those above the mean to the average income of those below 
the mean.












































































































Distributional "advantage” in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland relative to UK
Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland
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